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Abstract 
This study seeks to understand how political connections affect firm performance. Using a 
hand-collected dataset of Pakistani firms during 2008-2014, our firm fixed effects and 
Heckman two-stage regression results show that connected firms outperform those without 
political ties. Moreover, we show channels though which political benefits are realized in terms 
of greater access to debt, lower financing costs and lower tax rates. These benefits are found to 
be particularly large when firms are connected to politicians who held political positions most 
recently and firms connected through their owners. Finally, we do not find evidence for 
differences in political favours across regulated and unregulated industries.   
Keywords: Political Connections; Performance; Political Environment; Access to credit 
market; Effective Tax rate; Political Strength  
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1. Introduction 
The existing empirical evidence acknowledges both positive and negative returns to political 
connections. On the one hand, the existing studies indicate that having political connections 
deteriorate the controlling function of the board (You and Du, 2012), increase the risk of 
diverting the firm’s resources to political objectives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), and decrease 
in performance due to lower managerial incentives (Saeed et al., 2016; Claessens et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, studies document that political connections facilitate firms in accessing bank 
loans and other funds (Infante and Piazza, 2014; Faccio, 2010; Li et al., 2008), improve 
performance (Boubakri et al., 2012a; Du and Girma, 2010), lower the cost of equity (Boubakri 
et al., 2012b), increase the probability of bail-out (Faccio et al., 2006), and improve firm’s 
chances of acquiring government contracts (Tahoun, 2014) or subsidies (Zhang et al., 2014). 
Taken together, the existing empirical evidences are equivocal in assessing the impact of 
political connections on firms’ decisions.  
In this paper, we report further empirical evidence on the consequences of political 
connections and show that how the political affiliation of listed companies impact their 
performance. To conduct this study, we use Pakistan as our empirical setting for a number of 
reasons. First, political connections are commonplace in Pakistan and have a large impact on 
firm behaviour. In fact, in the past one and half decade, three assemblies and the prime 
ministers were dissolved against charges of political patronage, corruption and 
maladministration; such situations imitate the extensive level of political corruption, which 
significantly affect organization behaviour. Second, contrary to prior researches from the 
emerging countries which captured the political patronage is a narrow way, where 
organizational political outcomes can only be attained by a strong affiliation with a single 
powerful political actor (Mahathir in Malaysia and Suharto in Indonesia)1, and many politicians 
in Pakistan are in position to advantage their allied companies. In addition, the capacity to attain 
political profits depends on the power of politician. In this regard, Pakistani political landscape 
offers a wide variation in level of influence that politicians can exert to benefit connected firms. 
Third, in the last decade, Pakistan undertook drastic steps to curb political corruption. 
According to new law public officials and politician must declare their assets. Additionally, 
the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) was introduced in 2002 with to purpose to 
reduce corruption stems from the political system. However, the effectiveness of these steps is 
questionable, as the process of accountability is obstructed in various ways, for instance, a 
1
 For instance, these studies include Johnson and Mitten (2003) and Fisman (2001). 
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constitution bill was passed to give exemption to the armed forces and judiciary from the 
accountability process, and the NRO (National Reconciliation Ordinance) was introduced 
which granted amnesty to the accused politicians for the corruption and abuse of power. 
Therefore, the question whether politically connected firms in Pakistan benefit from political 
support is still not clear. These features provide a natural and excellent research setting to 
examine whether and how political connectedness effect firm performance? We consider two 
channels through which political connections are realized: access to credit market and effective 
tax rate.  
Moreover, unlike developed economies where cronyism takes the form of formal 
favorable policies and subsidies, and political favouritisms in emerging economies usually 
appear in the form of preferential credit, utility bill exemptions and tax incentives2. Of these 
political benefits, utility bill exemptions are difficult to measure in Pakistan and data is 
unavailable. Therefore, in this study we rely on access to bank loan, cost of finance and tax 
benefits as channels through which connections pay off. In the context of Pakistan, the extent 
of annual corporate tax evasion is between Rs 700 billion to Rs 1 trillion (almost 21% of GDP 
in year 2012) which is generally done through utilizing political influence. Similarly, the 
volume of written-off loans in last decade, mostly on political interferences, amounted to Rs. 
96 billion which may project the role of politics in corporate lending. These facts are illustrative 
of the widespread tax avoidance and political rent provision in the economy.  
To examine the impact of political connections on firm performance, we employ the 
firm fixed effect model and Heckman two-stage estimation technique. Using a hand-collected 
data of political connections of Pakistani firms during the period 2008-2014, our results reveal 
that firms having political connection show a better performance in terms of ROA and Tobin’s 
Q than those without any political association. The empirical findings of the study further 
indicate that political ties enable firms to have greater access to the loans (measured as the ratio 
of book value of total debt to total assets) and at the same time, lower their financing costs 
(proxied by interest expenses scaled by total liabilities) and connected firms pay taxes at 
significantly lower rates (proxied by effective tax rate) in Pakistan. These results are robust to 
2
 Implementation of favourable public policies is also one of the mechanisms for channelling political favour to 
connected firms which is widely observed in certain developing countries such as Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia (Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). However, in the context of Pakistan, this is not a viable 
strategy to extract political benefits because the ruling and opposition party members share the same business 
interests. They either own or affiliate with Sugar mills, steel industry or textile industry. So, any change in 
regulations and economic policies (to either safeguard their business or to curb the opponents) ultimately affect 
both parties.  
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alternative estimation techniques, alternative proxy of political connections, industry adjusted 
variables, and alternative sample. 
In additional analyses, we show that connections with politicians having political 
position most recently exert a larger impact on the political favours, which suggests that the 
benefits associated with the political connections ultimately rest on political strength of 
connected politician. We also examine whether the connections through board members or firm 
owners drive these effects. We find that connections through firm owners are more valuable 
for firms; however we can’t negate the economic value of connections through corporate board 
members. Lastly, these political benefits are compared across regulated and unregulated 
industries. In contrast to earlier studies (e.g., Civilize et al., 2015), we do not find evidence for 
larger political benefits in regulated industries.    
This study advances the existing literature along three lines. Firstly, our research 
contributes to a growing literature by exploring the likely channels through which political 
benefits may be realised (Infante and Piazza, 2014; Faccio, 2010; Li et al., 2008; Baum et al., 
2008). We further show that political benefits depend on the type and political strength of 
connection. To do so, we construct several measures of the strength of political connections by 
distinguishing between the political connection through owner and director, and affiliation to 
ruling and opposition party, and the most recent political appointment. By doing this, we extend 
the work of Khwaja and Mian (2005) who show that Pakistani firm connected to politicians 
enjoy preferential treatment in credit market. Unlike Khwaja and Mian (2005), who employed 
the bank lending data and examine their lending patterns, we use the firm-level data and 
distinguish between strength of politician by various ways to examine the performance 
consequences of political connectedness and finding the channels through which these benefits 
can be realized. Our results for connections through owners are particularly unique and 
pertinent to countries in which the businessmen seek elections oneself to use public office to 
expand their businesses. This political strategy is more effective in countries where 
governments frequently change hands, makes it more costly for firms to maintain connections 
with individuals with recent political positions. Such short-term governments are observed 
worldwide, for example, in Bangladesh, Thailand, Nigeria, and Georgia. 
Secondly, our results contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the performance 
consequences of connections in emerging markets (e.g., Claessens et al., 2008; Arnoldi and 
Muratova, 2018; Lu, 2011; Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Being a transitional economy, Pakistani 
economy is experiencing significant institutional changes and market institutions are still in 
their infancy (Settle, 2016). To overcome the difficulties caused by the lack of market-
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supporting institutions, establishing managerial political ties is an inevitable response of firms 
operating in such environment. Pakistan has also a long tradition of using connections to 
achieve business goals (Jan Pehchan in Urdu), and success of a business in Pakistan is heavily 
depends on connections (McCarthy et al. 2012). In addition, the government in Pakistan 
composed of at two levels: national (federal), and provincial. Politicians at national level 
assume greater power as compared to those at provincial levels (due to the fact that economic 
resources lie with the federal government), exhibiting the existence of wide variation in the 
political influence within the Pakistani political landscape. Employing the empirical setting 
with such distinctive contextual features, indeed, expands our knowledge by offering a new 
insight into how business environment affect the consequences of corporate political 
connections.       
Lastly, we show that political connections play an important role in the determination 
of firm performance, debt decisions and effective tax rate (e.g., Dyreng et al., 2017; Koksal 
and Orman, 2015; Gupta & Newberry, 1997). This effect is beyond the well-known firm 
specific determinants of these outcomes. Thus, understanding of the firm performance can be 
enriched substantially if we focus on the corporate political activities in addition to the other 
firm’s characteristics.  
This paper unfolds as follows. The next section introduces the business-politics nexus 
in Pakistan and presents the Pakistani income tax policy. Section 3 discusses the development 
of the hypotheses. Section 4 explains the nature of the data and discusses the empirical design. 
The section 5 presents the results. Lastly, Section 6 presents the conclusions. 
2. Political connections and Pakistani context 
2.1. Business—Politics Nexus 
Politics in Pakistan has been connected with corruption, clientelism and rent-seeking. Pakistan 
is ranked amongst the most corrupt countries (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). The cases of 
corruption on the past three prime minister and their assemblies illustrate the extent of political 
corruption which has passed through the Pakistani economy during recent decades.  
The economy of Pakistan has largely been dependent on agriculture and related 
industries from its very establishment, which has given rise to two elite groups—migrated 
industrialists and landowners; they quickly and overwhelmingly controlled most of the 
country's industry and commerce (Monshipouri & Samuel, 1995). Most industrialists were 
involved in politics from the beginning of the country’s establishment—arguably with the aim 
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of protecting and expanding their interests. For example, Yusuf Haroon, a renowned 
industrialist, was the Chief Minister of Sindh at the creation of Pakistan and politicians like 
Naseer A Shiekh, Rafiq Saigol and Ahmad Dawood were the founding owner of the various 
business groups (Rehman, 2006). The current leadership of the leading political parties is also 
controlled by business tycoons3. Politicians in the government connected with business groups 
have also protect their business benefits. For example, a leading Pakistani newspaper, The 
News, during 2002-2007, documented how, United Bank Limited (UBL) and National Bank of 
Pakistan (NBP) allotted loan of Rs. 120 million to the President of PML-Q (Chauhadry group) 
against their sugar and textile mills on special terms, which were later written off.  
2.2. Income tax policy and compliance 
Pakistan is amongst those countries which have lowest tax-to-GDP ratios, tax to GDP ratio of 
Pakistan has been moving around 9% for the last few years.  This indicates that the tax base 
remains constricted and a minor portion of the country is heavily taxed. According to a World 
Bank study, the tax gap (tax evasion) has increased from 69 percent to 79 percent during 2008 
to 2012. Corporate tax rate in Pakistan is 35% which is much higher than the global average of 
25.5% and regional ASEAN average of 27.5%.  
Against this backdrop, the governments have tried to reform Pakistan’s tax system. The 
central government offered a reduction in tax rate to small firms and Association of Persons 
(AOPs) in an effort to increase the revenue collection and to encourage the investment. Under 
the Stand-By arrangement with IMF in October 2008, Pakistan agreed to move ahead with 
substantive tax policy and administrative reforms. Despite all rhetoric of tax reforms in the last 
decade or so, no significant progress is visible in tax revenue. This is mainly because the tax 
enforcement in Pakistan is notoriously weak and government is failing to tackle endemic 
corruption in tax machinery. In such an environment, companies and individuals avoid paying 
taxes because the risk of detection is very small and if they do get caught they can use political 
influence to find the way out.   
According to the Federal Board of Revenue, 60 percent of Pakistan’s cabinet and two 
third of its federal lawmakers did pay little or no income tax in 2011, despite an estimated 
average net wealth of $882,000. According to the report, current President Asif Zardari (also 
owner of Sakrand Sugar Mill, Pangrio Sugar Mills, and Bachani Sugar Mills) did not file a tax 
3
 Nawaz Sharif (owner of Ittefaq Foundries) is the president of Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and Chauhadry 
Shujaat Hussain (owner of Chauhadry Group) is the president of PML-Q. Pakistan People’s Party leadership has 
been dominated by the landowners in the beginning, but currently it is headed by Asif A. Zardari, who is a leading 
industrialist. 
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return in 2011. Similarly, former Railway Minister Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (Owner of Bilour 
Enterprises) did not pay tax in 2011 and neither did 34 of the 55 cabinet members file tax 
returns. Astonishingly, Commerce Minister Makhdoom Amin Fahim—also a member of board 
of directors of Service Group of Industries— does not even possess a national tax number4. 
These facts are illustrative of the widespread extent of tax evasion and the corruption norms 
within the economy. A similar level of tax evasion is anticipated from the corporate sector 
when they appoint politicians to their boards.  
3. Theory and hypotheses development 
In this section, the main hypotheses to be tested in this paper are developed. These hypotheses 
are as follows: 
Political connections and firm performance 
According to the resource-based view, a firm’s competitive advantage lies in obtaining 
valuable tangible and intangible assets that are difficult or at least excessively costly for 
competitor firms to obtain. The political economy literature has long noted that political 
relationships are valuable resources to individual firms which exert positive impact on 
profitability (e.g., Saeed et al., 2015; Faccio, 2010; Fisman 2001).  
Owing to positive affect, there are many reasons behind why politically connected 
organizations outperform than non-connected organizations. Most importantly, access to the 
main resources form the government results in the competitive advantage, which can be seen 
into better profitability (Faccio, 2010; Li et al., 2008; Chang & Wong, 2004). Moreover, 
politicians connected with firms are usually outsiders to business world; they provide an 
independent view that ultimately enhances firm financial performance (Niessen & Ruenzi, 
2010). Lastly, politicians have more access to information relating to future economic strategic 
policies, so they are in the better position to help firms in making profitable decisions for the 
near future avenues. Empirical evidence to support this argument is sufficient. In a seminal 
work, Fisman (2001) estimated the value of political connections in Indonesia and reports that 
rumours of Suharto’s deteriorating health adversely affected the stock price performance of the 
firms related to the president. Goldman et al. (2011) look at the effect of political connections 
on the allocation of procurement contracts in US and find that the government favours in 
allocating procurement contract to connected firms which effect positively on their long-term 
4
 “Over 60 percent of Pakistani lawmakers use their political influence to evade taxes” published in the Dawn, a 
Pakistani newspaper, on December 12, 2012. 
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performance. Ferguson and Voth (2008) explore the political ties of German industrial 
organizations to the Nazi party in early 1933 and observe positive stock market performance 
for firms with substantial ties with Nazi party after the Nazi party rose to power. In a cross-
country study, Faccio (2006) finds a positive association between political connections and 
firm financial performance. In Malaysian market, Johnson and Mitton (2003) observe a strong 
positive correlation between stock market performance and political connections. Lastly, 
Boubakri et al. (2012a) report that politically connected organizations gain financial profits 
from their connections with politicians.  
However, there are studies contradict these findings. Studies documenting the 
insignificant or negative association between firm’s political ties and financial performance 
have a standpoint that boards of political connected firms does not have managerial incentives 
to increase shareholder’s value and firm profitability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). For instance, 
based on a sample of 245 privatized firms from 41 countries, Boubakri et al. (2008) document 
that connected firms show poor performance compared to those firms lacking such ties. Faccio 
(2010) finds that in spite of the advantages they obtain, firms linked with political connections 
exhibit poor accounting performance compared to their non-connected counterparts. Bertrand 
et al. (2007) and Fan et al. (2007) report the same pattern in France and China, respectively for 
firms with political connections. 
Taken together, empirical research brings us to the conclusion that there is mixed 
evidences at best on the effect of political ties on firm profitability. However, given the weak 
legal system, lack of institutional stability and pervasive rent-seeking behaviour that 
characterize many developing countries, the benefits from political connections frequently 
outweigh the costs of these connections. We, therefore, anticipate a positive impact of political 
connections on firm performance in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q in Pakistan, leading to the 
following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, politically connected firms have better performance than non-
connected firms.  
Mechanisms through which political connections payoff 
As discussed above, earlier studies recognise various economic advantages that firms can gain 
from establishing connections with politicians, which include: preferential access to finance, 
receiving favourable regulatory treatment, allocation of government contracts, obtaining 
government bailout in case of financial trouble and paying lower taxes. Desai & Olofsgard 
9 
(2011) illustrates that, political favours in developing countries typically appear in the form of 
preferential credit to certain organizations, utility bill exemptions and tax deduction. Of these 
political benefits, utility bill exemptions are difficult to measure in Pakistan and data is 
unavailable. Therefore, in this study we rely on access to credit market (which includes level 
of indebtedness and cost of finance) and tax benefits as channels through which connections 
pay off.  
Anecdotal evidence shows that politically affiliated firms in different countries enjoy 
preferential treatment in credit market. For example, Khwaja & Mian (2005) argue that 
politically connected organization get loan to almost double of non-politically connected 
organizations, and the default rate is 50% higher on these credits. The lending pattern is highly 
dominant for stated owned banks rather than privately held banks. In a similar vein, 
Charumilind et al. (2006) report that politically connected Thailand organizations had greater 
access to long-term loans with less collateral needed. They employed various methods for 
political connections and they argue that political ties are the important antecedents of firm’s 
future loans. Based on firm level data from Brazil, Claessens et al. (2008) show that following 
the Federal deputy elections, political connections have a positive relationship with bank 
leverage.  
Largely, these studies set forth two important reasons for preferential access to credit 
market as most prevalent outcome of political ties. First, political influence is supposed to be 
greater over lending decisions than over other regulatory decisions as the decision making of 
banks commonly reflects the policies dictated by the government. Second, extorting better loan 
terms for favoured firms is likely to garner less public attention than other regulatory favours 
such as implementing laws to limit or handicap competitors. In view of this discussion, it seems 
safe to conclude that preferential bank credit is one of the most pervasive mechanisms used by 
politicians to benefit their associated firms. Effectively, this easier access to financing 
encourages firms to utilize more debt in financing decisions. Equally important is the fact that 
larger debt does not necessarily signify a better deal for the company if the interest rate of the 
loan is high. So, it is crucial to investigate does the connected firms avail lower interest rates.  
Regarding tax deduction benefits, there are two foremost advantages of employing 
taxation as a measure of government related benefits. Firstly, it has a direct and definite impact 
on a firm’s net income than other benefits, such as a favourable regulatory treatment. Secondly, 
since taxes are collected by the government therefore tax benefits are a more direct reflection 
of the functions of the politically connected directors. Examining the tax compliance of firms 
in Malaysia, Adhikari et al. (2006) investigate the link between effective tax rate and corporate 
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political connectedness in Malaysian context. They find that firms with political relationships 
pay tax at significantly lower effective rate than firms lacking such relationships. This notion 
is also investigated by Wu et al. (2012), who provide evidence on the impact of politically 
connected managers on the tax benefits received by firms in Chinese market. Their results 
divulge that effective tax rates of private firms having political ties are lower than that of private 
firms without such ties.  
Based on these lines of reasoning, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, politically connected firms have higher leverage and lower 
financing cost than non-connected firms.  
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, politically connected firms pay lower taxes than non-
connected firms.  
4. Research design 
4.1. Data sources and sample selection criteria 
The data for this study is taken from three different sources. First, financial data is taken from 
the OSIRIS, over the period 2008–2014. OSIRIS covers publicly listed financial and non-
financial companies worldwide with a large selection of variables, and claims to provide annual 
accounting items for up to 10 years. However, the coverage differs greatly from one country to 
another, with better coverage for developed economies. Second, the data on politicians, which 
is gathered with the aim to locate the firms with political connections— is hand-collected, 
gathered from several sources including Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), State Bank 
of Pakistan and from official reports of the several regulatory bodies. Third, to supplement the 
ownership information provided in OSIRIS, we hand-collect information on ownership for 
some firms using additional sources (a book by Rehman (2006), newspapers, firm Web sites, 
annual report, etc.).  
Our data gathering process starts from obtaining a list of firms listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange as of 2008. This list provided us the names of 651 listed firms, of which 169 firms 
belong to financial sector. After excluding the financial firms, 482 firms were searched in 
Osiris database (to gather the firm-level data on them) and we found 361 non-financial 
Pakistani firms in the database. Subsequently, the data availability of these 361 firms was 
checked in OSIRIS and 18 firms were found to have missing information on key variables 
including financial variables, ownership structure, and board of directors. Off these 18 firms, 
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13 firms (3.6%) had no information on board composition and other key variables used the 
study during the entire period, and remaining 5 firms had missing information on financial 
variables. Regarding ownership data (shareholding pattern), most of the information is obtained 
from OSIRIS, however various other sources such as firm webpage, newspaper, annual reports 
were also consulted to complement the ownership data. Finally, we have to drop 18 firms with 
missing information from the sample. The resulting final sample comprises 2401 firm-year 
observations of 343 non-financial listed firms. Each firm in the study sample does contain the 
same number of time-series observations, and so this dataset is a balanced panel data. 
4.2. Variables measurement 
Measure of firm performance: Although there are various accounting measures centred on 
quantifying performance in the literature, for the purpose of this study, however, two measures 
are adopted—return on assets and Tobin’s Q—in common with similar works studying the 
outcomes of political connections on firms’ performance (Boubakri et al., 2008; Dombrovsky, 
2008; Fan et al., 2007). Return on assets is the ratio used in order to assess the ability of firms 
to generate return on the total assets available for application. This is defined as profit before 
taxes over total assets. Tobin’s Q is a market-oriented measure of a firm’s performance, shows 
firm’s ability to create shareholders’ wealth (Su and Fung, 2013). Tobin’s Q is constructed as 
the market value of equity plus book value of total debts divided by the book value of total 
assets. 
Measure of access to credit market and tax rate: We use two variables related to access to 
credit market, namely, total debt (DEBT) and financial expense ratiocost of finance
(FINANCOST). Similar to Su and Fung (2013) and Boubakri et al. (2012a), total debt is defined 
as the ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to the total assets, 
a proxy for the size of total loans. Further, financial expense ratio is interest expenses divided 
by total liabilities. Most Pakistani firms use bank loans to raise funds rather than issue bonds 
(Ashraf & Ghani, 2005); therefore, the debt of company is regarded as a bank loan and 
measured by their book value. 
A firm’s tax rate is measured by the effective income tax rate (ETR). To be consistent 
with the previous studies (Wu et al., 2012; Adhikari et al. 2006), we consider the current portion 
of tax, measured as tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses, and scale it with firm profit. 
While measuring the profit, the difference between accounting profit and tax profit need to be 
considered. The accounting profit might not accurately represent the actual taxable income of 
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the firms. Furthermore, dissimilar accounting policies would yield different incomes. So, to 
counter the difference in profit measurements, Zimmerman (1983) suggests the usage of cash 
flow instead of operating income. Subsequently, several studies have also adopted the 
suggested mechanism to calculate ETR (i.e. Gupta & Newberry, 1997). In the same spirit, we 
measure ETR as the ratio of tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses divided by operating 
cash flow.  
Measure of political connectedness: Following mainstream literature (Boubakri et al., 2012a; 
Faccio, 2010; Khwaja & Mian, 2005), an organization is considered politically connected if it 
has a politician on its board of directors. A person is considered as politician if he/she holds 
(or previously held) the position of prime minister, state minister, minister from the prime 
minister’s office, member of national or provincial cabinet, or head of the regulatory and 
supervisory bodies. To collect the information on politicians, we consulted official websites of 
Election Commission of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan and official reports of the several 
regulatory bodies. We supplement these sources with information available on the Internet. For 
each individual in database we establish their name, surname, political position and duration 
of political position. Subsequently, a politician’s name is matched to a company’s director if 
their full name (obtained from the OSIRIS) matches exactly that company is then defined as 
politically connected company. By so doing, 97 politicians were matched to firms’ directors. 
No politician was matched to more than one firm; therefore, 97 firms were identified as 
politically connected firms. In our analysis, firm’s political connectedness is represented by 
POLCON, a time-variant dummy variable taking one if firm has a politically connected 
director, and zero otherwise. 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample firms based on political connections and 
type of connection. From Table 1, we can see that 97 firms (with 604 firm-year observations) 
are politically connected. Of these connected firms, 29% are connected through their owner 
and 71% are connected through directors. Finally, 63% connections involve politicians who 
belong to the ruling party.  
Control variables: We also include several firm level characteristics as controls in our analyses. 
Specifically, we follow earlier literature and identity control variables that have been found 
correlated with firm performance and other financing decisions (Su & Fung, 2013; Wu et al., 
2012; Dombrovsky, 2008; Fan et al., 2007; Adhikari et al. 2006) In doing so, we control for 
the economies of scale or firm size by taking natural logarithm of total assets (SIZE), tangible 
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assets which is fixed assets divided by total assets (COLLATERAL) and firm’ operating cash 
flow (OPERCF) measured as firm’s operating cash flow divided by total assets. Data on 
operating cash flow is obtained from firm’s cash flow statement. In line with Fan et al. (2007) 
and Wu et al. (2012), we take the fraction of common shares held by the largest shareholders 
(LARGESHARE). Next, following Su & Fung (2013), we use the proportion of independent 
directors serving on the board (INDEPEND) to measure the quality of firm level corporate 
governance. The literature on corporate governance (e.g. Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001) shows 
that owing to the presumed independence of independent directors they are in a better position 
to monitor managerial activities which facilitate aligning managerial and shareholder interests. 
Accordingly, the presence of outside directors on board is expected to be linked with improved 
firm performance. 
4.3. Estimation model 
One potential concern in our analyses is the endogeneity problem which has to be considered 
in regression estimates. Corporate political connection may not be exogenous which means 
some unobservable determinants of performance and financing decisions may also explain 
political connections. In other words, board connectedness and performance may be jointly 
determined by unobservable firm-specific variables Moreover, it is also possible that firm’s 
likelihood to be politically connected may determine by the performance, which causes the 
simultaneous endogenity. To tackle the endogenity issue caused by unobservable firm specific 
variables and reverse causality, we use fixed effect estimation as our preferred estimation 
technique and compare the results with estimator obtained from Heckman’s two-stage 
approach (Heckman, 1979).  
Fixed effect estimation model 
Fixed effects estimation technique is considered as a widely accepted method of controlling 
for omitted variables bias in a panel data set (see Wintoki, 2007). By using firm fixed effects 
model on panel data, we can exploit the variation for same firm across years to obtain a clean 
identification. Specifically, we use firm fixed effects and industry×time fixed effects to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity5. The fixed effect model specification is as follows: 
5
 Industry fixed effects are based on the two-digit SIC code defined in Campbell (1996). Following the 
methodology of Cambell, firms are distributed among following eight industries: Food & Tabaco (36), Basic 
industries including petroleum (57), Construction (49), Textile & trade (128), Consumer durables (33), 
Transportation (9), Services (11), and others (20).         
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where INDICAT refers to the firm performance (PERFORMANCE), debt level (DEBT), 
cost of finance (FINANCOST), and effective tax rate (ETR). POLCON indicates political 
connectedness which is a dummy variable indicating the political connection of a firm. 
Furthermore, firm size (SIZE), collateral (COLLATERAL), operating cash flow (OPERCF), 
fraction of common shares held by the largest shareholders (LARGESHARE) and proportion of 
independent directors (INDEPEND) are control variables. Finally, fi are firm fixed effects, α
are industry fixed effects representing unobservable industry characteristics; λt are year fixed 
effects and  is the error term. The interaction term of industry and time fixed effects absorbs 
the changes occurred over the years at the industry level, for instance, regulatory measures for 
a certain industry.      
Heckman two-stage regression 
Heckman two-stage regression technique is designed to control for the firm’s selection into 
political connectedness on the basis of performance and other financial characteristics. The 
model consists of two stages as follows: 
First-stage regression: Determinants of political connections:  
The first stage of the procedure involves a probit model to estimate the determinants of firm’s 
probability to establish political connection. Specifically, the model for the first-stage 
regression is:        ,  =   +     ,  +   %          _      _         ,  +            , 
+   +    +   ,                                                                                                  (2)
where POLCON is a dummy variable which indicates the political connection of a firm that is 
regressed against all other firm-level control variables (Z), plus instrumental variables 
(selection model variables). In particular, based on prior research on political connections, we 
employed firm size, collateral, operating cash flow, proportion of common shares held by the 
largest shareholders and proportion of independent directors as control variables. Further, 
following Kim and Zhang (2016), Boubakri et al. (2012a), Chaney et al. (2011) and Agrawal 
& Knoeber (2001) we include percentage of connected firm in an industry (% 
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CONNECTED_FIRMS_INDUSTRY) and the firm’s location (LOCATION) —a dummy 
variable takes value 1 if the firm is located in the two largest cities of the country, namely, 
Karachi and Lahore— is selected as an instrument of political connections. Earlier studies have 
evidently reported that these variables relate only to the political connections—not with other 
political benefits. Similar argument may apply to the location variable. Lastly, α are industry 
fixed effects representing unobservable industry characteristics; λt are year fixed effects and 
is the error term. To avoid some problems of endogeneity at this stage, all independent variables 
are lagged one year. 
Second-stage regression: Outcomes of political connections 
In the second stage, we regress various outcomes of political connections (performance, 
leverage, cost of finance and effective tax rate) on the political connectedness after controlling 
for firm-level variables (as shown below in models 2), and the inverse Mills ratio obtained 
from the first regression.   
The regression model used to test how political connections affect firm performance 
resembles those of Su & Fung (2013), Boubakri et al. (2012a) and Li et al. (2008). It 
encompasses the following general form:         ,  =   +          ,  +        ,  +              ,  +           , 
+              ,  +            ,  +         ,  +   +   
+   ,                                                                                                                                (3)
where INDICAT refers to the firm performance (PERFORMANCE), debt level (DEBT), cost of 
finance (FINANCOST), and effective tax rate (ETR). POLCON indicates political 
connectedness. MILLS is inverse Mills ratio from stage-1 to control for selection bias. The 
Hypothesis 1 predicts a positive and significant coefficient for POLCON. In testing Hypothesis 
2a, we expect POLCON to be positive and significant for DEBT, whereas negative and 
significant for FINANCOST and ETR. 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables that are used 
in the analysis. The average return on assets for the entire sample (in Panel A) is 4.99 and the 
Tobin’s q is on average 7.30. The financial debt amounts to 68% of total assets and the average 
cost of debt is 3% of total assets. The effective tax rate for sample has a mean of 0.26. 
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Panel B & C provide preliminary univariate statistics for the sub-samples of connected 
firms and their non-connected peers. In Panel B, the results show a clear tendency for connected 
firms to be more profitable than non-connected ones. More specifically, the average return on 
assets for connected firms is 6.38, which is significantly larger than the value for non-connected 
firms (4.53). Tobin’s q shows an even greater difference. The debt of connected firms is 
significantly higher than that of their non-connected peers (71% vs. 65%). Surprisingly, the 
cost of finance for connected firms is not significantly different from non-connected firms. 
Connected firms, however, enjoy significantly lower tax rate than their non-connected 
counterparts (32% vs. 21%).   
Regarding other characteristics, Table 2 indicates that connected and non-connected 
firms differ in some aspects of their demographics and conduct. The former are larger, enjoy 
superior access to external finance and tend to possess large physical assets. Finally, politically 
affiliated firms are quite similar to non-affiliated firms in terms of growth opportunities, 
percentage of large shareholdings, and board structure.  
5.2. Main results 
5.2.1. Fixed effect regression results 
We begin with performance as a dependent variable in regressions (Panel A) and subsequently 
access to credit market (Panel B) and effective tax rate (Panel C) are used as dependent 
variables in the estimations. Table 3 presents the results of the fixed effects estimations. As 
shown in Column 1 of Table 3, the coefficient of PC is significantly positive at the 1% level, 
which specifies that political connected organization have a higher ROA than those without 
connections. More specifically, the connected firms have a higher ROA of 0.031 percentage 
point than the non-connected organizations. To affirm our findings, we re-estimated our model 
with Tobin’s Q. The impact of political ties on Tobin’s Q is also found to be positive. The 
results in Column 2 reveal that firms with political connections outperform non-politically 
connected firms by 0.054 percentage points. Regarding control variables, firms with larger size, 
having large collateral, adequate cash flow and large proportion of independent directors have, 
ceteris paribus, superior performance. The finding in both panels strongly support the first 
hypothesis and is in line with studies, such as Boubakri et al. (2012a) and Dombrovsky (2008), 
all of whom report superior performance for connected firms.  
Taken together, the regression results show that firms with politically connected 
directors experience increasing performance regardless of whether performance is measured 
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by return on assets or the Tobin’s Q. The results are consistent with our hypothesis 1 and the 
univariate findings that connected firms outperform their non-connected counterparts.  Our 
findings closely resemble findings in Fan et al. (2007), Faccio (2006) and Charumilind et al.
(2006), all of which illustrate the determining role of connections on firm performance.  
Access to credit market: We next examine the effect of political connections in the credit 
market. In Column 3 of Table 3, the variable of total size of credit, DEBT, is positively and 
significantly correlated with political connections, a result indicating that political connected 
firms receive more loans. Statistically, connected firms have a higher debt to assets ratio of 
0.047 percentage points when compared to firms without such connections. This significant 
positive effect of political connection on size of debt lends support to our hypothesis 2a. Our 
result corroborates the anecdotal evidence that firms connected to politicians use more credit.  
We now proceed to analyse whether or not political connections help firms in reducing 
finance cost. Columns 4 shows that the FINANCOST relates to political connections negatively, 
affirming that connected firms benefit from lower interest rates. This estimate indicates that 
interest rate is about 0.016 percentage points lower in firms with political connections. The 
coefficients of the inverse Mills ratio are significant in all models, suggesting that ordinary 
least square regressions likely bias the coefficients.   . 
The collective results lend support to Hypothesis 2a that political connections enable 
firms to obtain preferential treatment in credit market through easier access to finance and 
reduced cost of credit. The preferential treatment to connected firms complements the findings 
of prior studies such as Infante & Piaza (2014); Su & Fung (2013), and Asquer & Calderoni 
(2011).  
Effective tax rate: We now turn to alternative financing policy which may have effect of 
corporate political connectedness, namely, the tax benefits. In Panel C of Table 3, the 
coefficient of POLCON is significantly negative (coefficient= -0.034, p-value < 0.01). This 
represents that firms with political relationships have lower ETRs of 0.034 percentage point 
than those without such relationships. The regression results support our Hypothesis 2b which 
predicts that firms having politically connected directors pay taxes at lower rate than other 
firms lacking such relationships.  
Taken together, our regression results establish two important points so far. Firstly, we 
show that political connection is linked with substantial gains in performance. This superior 
performance is through preferential treatment in credit market and tax benefits. It is accordance 
with prior studies such as Faccio (2010), Li et al., (2008) and Chang & Wong, (2004). 
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Secondly, it is worth noticing that impact of political connections on cost of finance is weakest 
in comparison to the effect of connections on the size of loan obtained and tax rate. One 
potential explanation might be that connected firms accumulate loans with the intention of not 
being returned therefore they are least concerned with the cost of finance. It has also been 
reported in Khwaja & Mian (2005) that wilfully defaulting on loans is indeed a notorious way 
of amassing funds by politically connected firms in Pakistan. Hence, we may state that due to 
default intentions, connected firms acquire less benefits though the channel of financing cost.  
5.2.2. Heckman two-stage regression results 
First-stage regression results 
First-stage regression findings for the determinants of political connections are presented in 
Table 4. We find that firm size relates significantly positive with political connections, 
suggesting that firm size is a significant element of the likelihood of establishing political 
connections. Moreover, politically connected organizations have higher leverage. These results 
are in line with Chaney et al. (2011). Further, organizations located in Islamabad and Lahore 
tend to establish connections more frequently as compared to firms located elsewhere. Finally, 
politically connected firms come from more political active industries. These results 
corroborate with Kim and Zhang (2016).   
Second–stage regression results  
Table 5 presents the second-stage results. In Column (1) and (2), the coefficient on the 
interaction term between politically connected director’s appointment and the period following 
the appointment enters positively and significantly for both measures of performance. In 
particular, the connected firms yield, on average, 0.023 percentage point higher return on their 
available assets than their non-connected peers. Similar finding is obtained for Tobin’s Q. 
Result indicates that average market value difference between connected and non-connected 
firms is 4.6%. It indicates that appointment of politically connected director increases the 
performance of connected firms. The value of MILLS is significant in both columns, showing 
the effectiveness of controlling for endogeneity of political connection variable. As for as 
control variables are concerned, large businesses and firms with large proportion of 
independent directors have better performance. Moreover, ownership of large shareholders 
exerts a positive effect only on Tobin’s Q.   
Further, in column (3) where debt is the dependent variable, the coefficient on the 
interactive term shows that appointing politically connected director exerts a positive and 
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significant impact. The variable of total size of credit, DEBT, is positively and significantly 
correlated with political connections.  Result indicates that politically affiliated firms receive 
more loans. In economic terms, it can be stated that connected firms, on average, have a higher 
debt to asset ratio of 0.065 percentage points as compared to their non-connected counterparts. 
This result lends support to our hypothesis 2a.  
Finally, in column (4 & 5), the negative and significant coefficients on political 
connection variable indicate that connected firms avail loan at lower cost and have lower 
effective tax rates after appointing politically connected director as compared to control firms. 
In terms of economic value, connected firms bear lower debt cost of 0.009 percentage point 
and have lower effective tax rate of 0.029 percentage point. The negative and significant results 
for cost of loan and tax rate support our hypothesis 2a and 2b. The coefficients of the inverse 
Mills ratio are significant in all models, suggesting that ordinary least square regressions likely 
bias the coefficients. Overall, the results shown in this section confirm our earlier results and 
mitigate the endogenity concern at greater extent.   
5.3. Additional analyses 
Connections through board of directors versus connections through owners  
Nevertheless, before concluding that political connections have determining role in firm 
performance, we delve a level deeper and consider that all connections might not be equally 
effective. For instance, connections through firm owner might be more valuable (ceteris 
paribus) than connections through board of directors because of their direct personal economic 
benefits coupled with the firm decisions. So, as an extension of our findings, we distinguish 
between the effects of the connections that are established via the board of directors and 
connections through the owners of the company. Following Faccio (2010), we define a firm 
connected through owner when the firm controlling shareholder —who owns at least 10% of 
the shares— is a politician6. Empirically, we split the 97 connected firms among firms that are 
politically connected through their directors (firms where politicians are only member of board 
of directors), and firms that are connected via their owners (firms where politicians are not only 
the member of board of directors but are also the company’s owner)7. Multiple data sources 
are used to identify the firm ownership. Rehman (2006) provides detailed ownership 
6
 This threshold choice is based on the literature (Faccio, 2006; Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang, 2009). 
By holding this level of ownership, controlling shareholders have incentives to bring resources to the company.  
7
 Member of Board of directors include directors, CEO, CFO, Chairman, etc and we don’t distinguish between 
them mainly because of the small number of connected CEOs and Chairmen in our sample.  
20 
information. The missing ownership information for certain firms is gathered through other 
sources such as newspapers, websites and annual reports. Following this identification scheme, 
29(27.10%) of the connected firms are connected through their owners. To empirically conduct 
this examination, we replace POLCON variable (used in equations 2) with two dummies, 
POLDIRECTOR and POLOWNER, which indicate whether a firm is connected through 
director or owner, respectively. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of fixed effect 
regressions. For brevity, regression estimates for control variables are not reported. In each 
model, POLDIRECTOR and POLOWNER are introduced separately in the regressions.  
As shown in Panel A of Table 6, the coefficients of both POLDIRECTOR and 
POLOWNER are positive and significant. Specifically, both types of connections increase 
performance in terms of ROA and Tobin’s Q. The performance is found to be higher for firms 
connected through their owners. This evidence suggests that political benefits are larger if firm 
owners participate in the politics by themselves—directly protects their business interests. 
Columns (5-8) of Table 6 report the results for the size of credit used and the cost of finance 
variables. Similar pattern emerges from the regressions as observed earlier in Table 3. The 
estimated coefficients on POLDIRECTOR and POLOWNER are statistically significant. This 
indicates that both types of connections benefit connected firms by providing easier and 
cheaper credit, however, companies connected through their owners are benefited more in 
credit market. Columns (9) and (10) of Table 6 present the results for effective tax rate. The 
results indicate that only firms connected through their owner enjoy lower tax rates whereas 
connections through directors do not affect firm tax rate.     
Taken together, our results in Table 6 indicate that both connections, through directors 
and owner, have a valuable effect on business operations nevertheless latter is more important 
than the former in assessing the value of political capital.  
Political strength 
The prior studies shows that politically connected companies benefit more when they are 
connected to the politician having more influence (i.e., Infante & Piaza, 2014; Asquer & 
Calderoni, 2011). Belonging to ruling party and having political position ultimately increases 
the political strength of a politician in obtaining even greater governmental benefits therefore 
they are better able to provide political favours. To empirically test this conjecture, we replace 
political connection variable in earlier equations with two measures of political strength. First 
measure is a dummy variable POLCON_RUL indicating if the connected politician belongs to 
the ruling party or not. Second proxy POLCON_RECENT captures the recentness of director’s 
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most latest political position. Following Kim and Zhang (2016), it is defined as one divided by 
one plus the escalated years between the current year and that of the most recent political 
position of the connected director. For instance, the value of POLCON_RECENT is one if the 
firm has a director who holds a position in the current year. Empirically, we replace the political 
connection indicator in equation (2) witch one of the measures of political connection’ strength. 
Results are shown in Panel B of Table 6. Results for both measures of political strength confirm 
our earlier results. However, the magnitude of coefficients indicates that directors with most 
recent political positions can provide additional benefits to their connected firms. The findings 
corroborate the earlier studies of Infante & Piaza (2014) and Asquer & Calderoni (2011).    
Impact of political connections across regulated and unregulated industries 
Some studies point out that the political favours for connected companies is more dominant in 
industries that are more dependent on government (e.g., Houston et al., 2014). Considering the 
fact that government in Pakistan has considerable power over resources allocation and 
regulatory changes, which tends to concentrate in regulated industries. This is particularly true 
for the energy, transportation, telecommunication, pharmaceutical, and technology sector. So 
it is expected that political favours tend to be higher in regulated sector. To test this notion, we 
stratify our sample into regulated and unregulated sub-samples and re-estimate our analysis 
separately on both sub-samples. Results are presented in Panel C of Table 6. In contrast to our 
expectations, empirical results do not find any evidence that political ties have a more 
favourable impact on firm financial performance and on other outcomes in regulated industries. 
In fact, benefits of being connected are almost the same across regulated and unregulated 
industries, as shown by Houston et al. (2014).       
5.4. Robustness tests 
Exclusion of state-owned firms 
In our analysis, we include state-owned firms, which are expected to have higher political 
involvement compared to private firms. We suspect that inclusion of state-owned firms might 
have driven our results. To alleviate this issue, in Panel A of Table 7, we present firm fixed 
effect results using only private firms (we excluded 14 state-owned firms). Our main findings 
remain unaffected, which is, performance, leverage, cost of finance and effective tax rate 
continue to be affected by political connections.    
Industry-adjusted measures 
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We re-estimate the regressions using industry adjusted dependent variables. In the empirical 
work, the measurement of industry-adjusted dependent variables is carried out by subtracting 
the specific value of firm i from the median value of all firms in that industry. For example, 
industry-adjusted return on assets is defined as: [(ROA of firm i) minus (median value of ROA 
for all firms in firm i’s primary two-digit SIC industry)]. Note that the sample is distributed 
among eight industry categories based on SIC as defined in Campbell (1996). 
Panel B of Table 7 presents the firm fixed effect regression estimates using industry 
adjusted dependent variables. Again, the results are qualitatively similar to the earlier 
estimations. Although, the estimated coefficient for the POLCON in the performance model is 
smaller (0.015 and 0.032 for ROA and Tobin’s Q, respectively) than that in the case without 
industry adjustments (0.023 and 0.046), nevertheless the direction of the relationship and 
statistical significance satisfy the hypothesis of political influence on the performance and other 
political outcomes. In sum, it can be concluded that our basic results are robust to industry-
adjusted measures.8
Alternative measure of political connections 
We recognize the fact that our measure of political relationship does not consider the 
connections that may be established through relatives, friends, or similar educational 
institutions (also termed as indirect connections). Consequently, there is a concern that our 
results might underestimate the impact of political connections. To this purpose, we redefine 
corporate political connections broadly by including both direct and indirect connections. 
Following Asquer & Calderoni (2011), indirectly connected company is defined as the one 
which has at least one friend or relative of a politician as the board of director. The information 
on indirect connections is retrieved from Pakistani newspapers, media reports and Internet. As 
an outcome, we found 11 cases of indirect connections, where board members are relative or 
friend of a politician. No firm is found to have more than one connected individual on board. 
Surprisingly, very small number of indirect connections is identified as compared to the direct 
connections. In part, this finding is due to the fact that Internet is not so developed in Pakistan 
and print media is under the political influence therefore the rate of success in detecting indirect 
connections remained very low.  
8
 As a robustness check, firm performance is also measured in terms of firm investment. Firm investment is 
measured as change in fixed assets from year t to t-1 divided by total assets in year t. The results show a positive 
and statistically significant impact of political connections on firm investment. These results are not reported for 
the sake of brevity.   
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The firm fixed effect estimates, with a broader definition of political connection, are 
presented in Panel C of Table 7. Our main results remain unaffected, that is, connections with 
politicians insert positive effects on firm performance. Further, connected firms continue to 
take political advantages though preferential access to credit at reduced rate and paying lower 
taxes. This evidence suggests that inclusion of indirect connections does not change our basic 
result.    
System GMM estimation technique
As robustness test, we re-estimate our main findings with system GMM (Arellano and Bond, 
1991), which is one of the widely employed estimated techniques in finance. System GMM is 
considered as a superior technique due to the fact that it controls unobservable heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity in the relationship between corporate outcomes and 
board structure. To control unobservable firm heterogeneity, system GMM includes not only 
firm fixed effects but also allows current values of political connections and control variables 
to be influenced by previous levels of these variables. This is an important aspect of a dynamic 
panel estimator. In addition, theoretically, firm appoints politically connected director to 
improve firm performance, while performance is affected by the appointment of connected 
director however the reverse may also be true. To solve the endogeneity problem caused by 
simultaneity, one way is to estimate the effect of appointment of connected director on firm 
performance using a system of equations. Estimating system of equations requires exogenous 
instruments which system GMM generates from lagged-value of original regressors. In fact, 
system GMM considers the underlying relationship between firm performance (or other 
financial decisions), political connections and control variables as dynamic. Therefore, it uses 
past values of and past changes in political connection and control variables as instruments, 
which also provides the convenience to the users. The important assumption for GMM 
technique is that error term must not be serially correlated which indicates the validity of 
instruments. For this purpose, we consider Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions test and 
second-order (AR-2) test.  
Results are shown in Panel D of Table 7. The impact of political connections remains 
the same as earlier. Political connections continue to exert a positive and statistically significant 
effect on firm performance and connected firms still benefit from preferential access to credit 
at reduced rate and paying lower taxes. In sum, it indicates that our main results are robust to 
the sophisticated estimation techniques.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper examines that whether or not political connections affect firm performance and what 
the channels are through which political connections pay off. To conduct this study, we rely on 
hand-collected firm-level data from Pakistani non-financial listed firms during the period 2008 
to 2014. Using firm fixed effect method and Heckman two-stage model estimation technique, 
we find that political connections exerts a positive impact on firm performance a result that is 
robust to a battery of checks including industry-adjusted measures of the dependent variables, 
alternative sample and the alternative measure of political connections. Subsequently, we first 
document that political ties enable firms to access easy to debt at lower cost. Secondly, our 
findings show that connections facilitate firms to obtain tax cuts.  
As an extension, we explore whether connections through directors or owners are more 
valuable for firms. The results suggest that both connections drive the beneficial effects of 
political connections; however, the impact is larger if firm establish connections via their 
owners. Moreover, the impact of political affiliations is more pronounced for companies 
connected with directors having most recent political positions. This evidence supports the 
view that connections with more influential individuals worth more. Lastly, we do not find 
evidence that the impact of political affiliations is more positive in regulated industries. 
Importantly, we extended almost the same conclusions regardless of whether we used 
firm fixed effect method or Heckman two-stage estimator. Overall, these findings provide 
support to the crony capitalism view that connected firms benefit from their connections and 
better perform.   
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TABLE 1. Sample distribution 
This table provides distribution of firms used in this study by connections and type of connections.
Years 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total 
No. of non-connected firms 262 265 259 249 256 261 264 1816 
No. connected firms 81 78 84 94 87 82 79 585 
Total observations 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 2401 
% of connected firms 30.91 29.43 32.43 37.75 33.59 31.41 29.92 32.21
Distribution of connected firms by definition (2008-2014) 
Definition Number (%)
Politically connected through owner 28(28.86)
Politically connected through director 69(71.14)
Politically connected with politicians belong to the ruling party 61(62.88)
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    TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses. ROA is the ratio of firm’s return (profit before taxes) over total assets (coded in %). Tobin’s 
Q is constructed as the market value of equity plus book value of total debts divided by the book value of total assets. DEBT is ratio of the book value of a firm’s total 
debt (short-term and long-term) to the total assets. FINANCOST is measured as interest expenses divided by total liabilities. ETR is the ratio of tax expenses minus 
deferred tax expenses divided by operating cash flow. POLCON is a dummy which takes one if there is a politician on board of directors, zero otherwise. SIZE is measured 
as log of the total assets of the firm. OPERCF is firm’s operating cash flow divided by total assets. COLLATERAL is the fraction of fixed assets by total assets. 
LARGESHARE is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders. INDEPEND is the ratio of independent directors divided by total number of directors.  
Panel A 
Entire sample 
Panel B 
Political Connected firms 
Panel C 
Non-connected firms 
Mean 
difference 
Mean St. Dev Min Max  Mean St. Dev Min Max  Mean St. Dev Min Max (t-statistics) 
ROA 4.99 10.72 -13.72 11.85  6.38 11.25 -13.67 9.91  4.53 10.28 -13.72 11.85 -4.82*** 
Tobin’s Q 7.30 9.34 5.46 10.02  9.14 9.75 5.46 10.02  7.06 9.04 6.02 9.82 -6.19*** 
DEBT 0.68 0.27 0.19 1.31  0.71 0.25 0.22 1.31  0.65 0.26 0.19 1.26 -3.41*** 
FINANCOST 0.03 0.02 -0.52 0.27  0.02 0.01 -0.56 0.25  0.04 0.02 -0.52 0.27 1.05 
ETR 0.26 0.18 0.02 1.45  0.21 0.16 0.04 1.45  0.32 0.19 0.02 1.33 2.18** 
SIZE 6.41 0.68 4.91 8.33  6.39 0.64 3.73 7.56  6.30 0.65 4.91 8.33 -2.02** 
OPERCF 1.24 3.16 0.02 2.07  1.18 3.39 0.02 2.01  1.31 3.42 0.03 2.07 1.64 
COLLATERAL 0.52 0.22 0.09 0.86  0.50 0.23 0.13 0.86  0.49 0.23 0.09 0.84 -0.70** 
LARGESHARE 0.29 0.07 0.01 0.81  0.35 0.08 0.01 0.79  0.27 0.06 0.01 0.81 -1.60 
INDEPEND 0.35 0.04 0.19 0.66  0.36 0.04 0.19 0.64  0.39 0.03 0.21 0.66 0.12 
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TABLE 3: Fixed effect regression results: Impact of political connections 
The table reports the regression results when political director is added on the board. All the variables are defined as follows. ROA is 
the ratio of firm’s return (profit before taxes) over total assets. Tobin’s Q is constructed as the market value of equity plus book value 
of total debts divided by the book value of total assets. DEBT is ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) 
to the total assets. FINANCOST is measured as interest expenses divided by total liabilities. ETR is the ratio of tax expenses minus 
deferred tax expenses divided by operating cash flow. PC is an indicator variable for a firm belonging to the treatment group. POST is 
a dummy variable for the post-treatment period, equals to one for period after the politically connected director is appointed and zero 
for the period before. SIZE is measured as log of the total assets of the firm. COLLATERAL is the fraction of fixed assets by total 
assets. OPERCF is firm’s operating cash flow divided by total assets. LARGESHARE is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders. INDEPEND is the ratio of independent directors divided by total number of directors. Standard errors clustered at firm 
level are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A: Firm performance  Panel B: Access to credit market  Panel C: ETR 
ROA  Tobin’s Q  DEBT  FINANCOST ETR 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
POLCON 0.031*** 
(0.005) 
 0.054*** 
(0.012) 
 0.047** 
(0.015) 
-0.016** 
(0.008) 
-0.034*** 
(0.008) 
SIZE 0.179*** 
(0.066) 
 0.201*** 
(0.073) 
 0.063** 
(0.021) 
0.284*** 
(0.081) 
-0.319*** 
(0.101) 
COLLATERAL 0.071* 
(0.035) 
0.105* 
(0.052) 
 0.295** 
(0.113) 
-0.413** 
(0.157) 
-0.204 
(0.516) 
OPERCF 0.015*** 
(0.002) 
 0.026*** 
(0.04) 
0.082* 
(0.040) 
0.012 
(0.037) 
0.041* 
(0.020) 
LARGESHARE 0.028 
(0.073) 
0.037 
(0.109) 
0.051 
(0.128) 
-0.096* 
(0.042) 
-0.010 
(0.029) 
INDEPEND 0.009*** 
(0.002) 
 0.016*** 
(0.003) 
 0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.053** 
(0.018) 
-0.012** 
(0.004) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 
Within R2 0.26 0.22 0.31 0.23 0.19 
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TABLE 4: First-stage regression results: Determinants of corporate political connections 
This table reports the probit regression results where dependent variable is POLCON. POLCON is a dummy 
which takes one if there is a politician on board of directors, zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as log of the 
total assets of the firm. COLLATERAL is the fraction of fixed assets by total assets. OPERCF is firm’s 
operating cash flow divided by total assets. LARGESHARE is the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholders. INDEPEND is the ratio of independent directors divided by total number of directors. % 
CONNECTED_FIRMS_INDUSTRY is the percentage of connected firm in an industry and LOCATION is a 
dummy variable takes value 1 if the firm is located in the two largest cities of the country, namely, Karachi and 
Lahore. Standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, where ***, 
** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Dependent Variable: POLCON 
SIZE 0.346*** 
(0.04) 
COLLATERAL 0.118*** 
(0.29) 
OPERCF 1.340 
(2.453) 
LARGESHARE 0.379 
(0.547) 
INDEPEND 0.026 
(0.075) 
% CONNECTED_FIRMS_INDUSTRY 0.231** 
(0.075) 
LOCATION 0.401** 
(0.137) 
Years FE  Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Number of Obs. 2401
Number of firms 343 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.39 
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TABLE 5: Second-stage regression results: Impact of political connections 
The table reports the coefficients for Heckman’s second-stage regression, where the variables are defined as follows. ROA is the ratio 
of firm’s return (profit before taxes) over total assets. Tobin’s Q is constructed as the market value of equity plus book value of total 
debts divided by the book value of total assets. DEBT is ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to the 
total assets. FINANCOST is measured as interest expenses divided by total liabilities. ETR is the ratio of tax expenses minus deferred 
tax expenses divided by operating cash flow. POLCON is a dummy which takes one if there is a politician on board of directors, zero 
otherwise. SIZE is measured as log of the total assets of the firm. COLLATERAL is the fraction of fixed assets by total assets. OPERCF 
is firm’s operating cash flow divided by total assets. LARGESHARE is the percentage of shares held by the largest shareholders. 
INDEPEND is the ratio of independent directors divided by total number of directors. INVERSE-MILLS is inverse Mills ratio obtained 
from the probit regression (first-stage of Heckman selection model). Standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses beneath 
the coefficient estimates, where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Firm performance  Panel B: Access to credit market  Panel C: ETR 
ROA  Tobin’s Q  DEBT  FINANCOST ETR 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
POLCON 0.023*** 
(0.005) 
 0.046*** 
(0.010) 
 0.065** 
(0.019) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.029** 
(0.010) 
SIZE 0.141** 
(0.051) 
 0.091*** 
(0.020) 
 0.201** 
(0.069) 
-0.078** 
(0.024) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
COLLATERAL 0.349 
(0.274) 
0.071 
(0.109) 
 0.025** 
(0.008) 
-1.046** 
(0.325) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
OPERCF 1.036 
(0.995) 
0.737 
(0.825) 
 0.092** 
(0.034) 
0.043 
(0.081) 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
LARGESHARE 0.044 
(0.091) 
0.036* 
(0.015) 
 0.072** 
(0.023) 
0.049 
(0.101) 
-0.020 
(0.068) 
INDEPEND 0.010* 
(0.004) 
 0.020** 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.030) 
-0.037 
(0.066) 
0.046 
(0.251) 
INVERSE-MILLS 0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.041* 
(0.20) 
 -0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.087** 
(0.029) 
0.059** 
(0.018) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.201 0.227 0.283 0.157 0.283 
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TABLE 6: Additional tests  
The table reports the firm fixed effect regression results of additional tests. ROA is the ratio of firm’s return (profit before taxes) over total assets. Tobin’s Q is constructed as the market 
value of equity plus book value of total debts divided by the book value of total assets. DEBT is ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to the total assets. 
FINANCOST is measured as interest expenses divided by total liabilities. ETR is the ratio of tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses divided by operating cash flow. POLDIRECTOR is 
a dummy which takes one if a firm is connected through board of directors, zero otherwise. POLOWNER is a dummy which takes one if a firm is connected through its owner, zero 
otherwise. POLCON_RUL is a dummy variable taking one if the connected politician belongs to the ruling party, zero otherwise. POLCON_RECENT is defined as one divided by one 
plus the escalated years between the current year and that of the most recent political position of the connected director. POLCON is a dummy which takes one if there is a politician on 
board of directors, zero otherwise. Standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Impact of political connections through board of directors and connections through owner 
Firm performance Access to credit market Effective tax rate 
ROA Tobin’s Q DEBT  FINANCOST ETR 
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
POLDIRECTOR 0.020*** 
(0.002) 
 0.040** 
(0.012) 
 0.056*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008*** 
(0.001) 
-0.025 
(0.097) 
POLOWNER 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
0.055** 
(0.016) 
0.081** 
(0.026) 
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.033*** 
(0.005) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.198 0.215 0.304 0.291 0.205 0.164 0.402 0.335 0.227 0.200 
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Panel B: Impact of connected directors’ political strength 
POLCON_RUL 0.026*** 
(0.003) 
 0.049*** 
(0.005) 
 0.063** 
(0.020) 
-0.007*** 
(0.001) 
-0.027** 
(0.009) 
POLCON_RECENT 0.040*** 
(0.010) 
0.057** 
(0.018) 
0.101** 
(0.032) 
-0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.042** 
(0.013) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.113 0.118 0.220 0.227 0.145 0.140 0.093 0.101 0.245 0.234 
Panel C: Impact of political connections across regulated and unregulated industries 
Firm performance Access to credit market Effective tax rate 
ROA Tobin’s Q DEBT FINANCOST ETR ETR 
Regulated Unregulated  Regulated Unregulated  Regulated Unregulated  Regulated Unregulated  Regulated Unregulated 
POLCON 0.025*** 
(0.001) 
0.024*** 
(0.004) 
 0.043** 
(0.011) 
0.045** 
(0.014) 
 0.073** 
(0.021) 
0.069*** 
(0.008) 
-0.010** 
(0.003) 
-0.011** 
(0.003) 
-0.019* 
(0.009) 
-0.022* 
(0.010) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.219 0.343 0.320 0.400 0.419 0.176 0.181 0.226 0.234 
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TABLE 7: Robustness tests 
Panel A of this table presents the results without state-owned firms. Panel B presents the robustness test with industry 
adjusted variables. Panel C presents the robustness test with broader measure of political connection, which includes both 
the direct and indirect political connections. The variables used in the regressions are defined as follows. ROA is the ratio 
of firm’s return (profit before taxes) over total assets. Tobin’s Q is constructed as the market value of equity plus book 
value of total debts divided by the book value of total assets. DEBT is ratio of the book value of a firm’s total debt (short-
term and long-term) to the total assets. FINANCOST is measured as interest expenses divided by total liabilities. ETR is 
the ratio of tax expenses minus deferred tax expenses divided by operating cash flow. In panel A&B, POLCON is a dummy 
which takes one if there is a politician on board of directors, zero otherwise; whereas in panel C, it also include political 
ties through friends and families. Standard errors clustered at firm level are in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates, 
where ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Exclusion of state-owned firms
Firm performance Access to credit market  Effective tax rate 
ROA Tobin’s Q  DEBT FINANCOST ETR 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
POLCON 0.026*** 
(0.004)
0.042*** 
(0.010)
0.066** 
(0.021)
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.020** 
(0.006)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.212 0.229 0.255 0.196 0.264 
Panel B: Industry adjusted variables 
POLCON 0.015*** 
(0.001) 
0.032** 
(0.010) 
0.062** 
(0.021)
-0.013** 
(0.005) 
-0.027* 
(0.015)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.230 0.213 0.274 0.179 0.311
Panel C: Alternative measure of political connections
POLCON 0.023*** 
(0.005) 
0.040*** 
(0.007) 
0.072*** 
(0.012)
-0.020*** 
(0.000) 
-0.033* 
(0.015)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry×Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.226 0.230 0.205 0.217 0.287
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Panel D: System GMM estimation technique
POLCON 0.012*** 
(0.005) 
0.024*** 
(0.007) 
0.049*** 
(0.012)
-0.009*** 
(0.000) 
-0.017** 
(0.06)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test 0.13 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.40 
AR-2 0.25 0.36 0.11 0.26 0.32 
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401 2401 
Number of firms 343 343 343 343 343 
Adjusted R2 0.140 0.312 0.329 0.401 0.192
